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 ﾠ
ABSTRACT	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠ paper	 ﾠ analyses	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ debate	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ introduction	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ progressive	 ﾠ rates	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
inheritance	 ﾠ tax,	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ took	 ﾠ place	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Spanish	 ﾠ Parliament	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ 1900.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ article	 ﾠ
highlights	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdebate	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠaspects:	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparliamentary	 ﾠ
discussion	 ﾠ itself,	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ controversial,	 ﾠ showed	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ atypical	 ﾠ alliance	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ
conservatives	 ﾠand	 ﾠrepublicans	 ﾠsupporting	 ﾠa	 ﾠvery	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠprogressivity.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠview,	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠwas	 ﾠjust	 ﾠa	 ﾠtool	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠreal	 ﾠtax	 ﾠproportionality,	 ﾠand	 ﾠby	 ﾠno	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
redistributive	 ﾠ measure.	 ﾠ Liberals'	 ﾠ opposition	 ﾠ feared	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ultimate	 ﾠ consequences	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
progressive	 ﾠtaxes	 ﾠand	 ﾠrefused	 ﾠits	 ﾠintroduction	 ﾠin	 ﾠSpain,	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠentailed	 ﾠserious	 ﾠhazard	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
property.	 ﾠSecond,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwide	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠideas	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠarguments	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdebate	 ﾠ
make	 ﾠ evident	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Members	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Parliament	 ﾠ taking	 ﾠ part	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ debate	 ﾠ had	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
noteworthy	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠexpertise.	 ﾠTherefore,	 ﾠparliamentary	 ﾠdiscussions	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
effectively	 ﾠcontributing	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprogress,	 ﾠexpansion	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstitutionalization	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
economy	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠSpain.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠprogressivity.	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 ﾠ
RESUMEN	 ﾠ
Este	 ﾠ artículo	 ﾠ analiza	 ﾠ el	 ﾠ debate	 ﾠ parlamentario	 ﾠ que	 ﾠ tuvo	 ﾠ lugar	 ﾠ en	 ﾠ 1900	 ﾠ acerca	 ﾠ de	 ﾠ la	 ﾠ
introducción	 ﾠde	 ﾠtipos	 ﾠprogresivos	 ﾠen	 ﾠel	 ﾠimpuesto	 ﾠde	 ﾠsucesiones.	 ﾠDicho	 ﾠdebate	 ﾠtiene	 ﾠ
dos	 ﾠ puntos	 ﾠ de	 ﾠ interés:	 ﾠ Por	 ﾠ un	 ﾠ lado,	 ﾠ la	 ﾠ discusión	 ﾠ –muy	 ﾠ controvertida–	 ﾠm o s t r ó 	 ﾠu n a 	 ﾠ
alianza	 ﾠatípica	 ﾠentre	 ﾠla	 ﾠmayoría	 ﾠparlamentaria	 ﾠconservadora	 ﾠy	 ﾠla	 ﾠminoría	 ﾠrepublicana	 ﾠen	 ﾠ
defensa	 ﾠde	 ﾠla	 ﾠintroducción	 ﾠde	 ﾠuna	 ﾠprogresividad	 ﾠlimitada	 ﾠen	 ﾠeste	 ﾠimpuesto.	 ﾠLos	 ﾠtipos	 ﾠ
progresivos	 ﾠservirían	 ﾠpara	 ﾠalcanzar	 ﾠuna	 ﾠproporcionalidad	 ﾠreal;	 ﾠnunca	 ﾠconstituirían	 ﾠuna	 ﾠ
medida	 ﾠfiscal	 ﾠredistributiva.	 ﾠFrente	 ﾠa	 ﾠellos,	 ﾠla	 ﾠoposición	 ﾠdel	 ﾠpartido	 ﾠliberal	 ﾠtemía	 ﾠlas	 ﾠ
consecuencias	 ﾠ últimas	 ﾠ de	 ﾠ la	 ﾠ introducción	 ﾠ de	 ﾠ la	 ﾠ progresividad	 ﾠ en	 ﾠ el	 ﾠ sistema	 ﾠ fiscal	 ﾠ
español,	 ﾠatacándola	 ﾠcon	 ﾠel	 ﾠargumento	 ﾠdel	 ﾠriesgo	 ﾠque	 ﾠentrañaba	 ﾠpara	 ﾠla	 ﾠpropiedad.	 ﾠEn	 ﾠ
segundo	 ﾠ lugar,	 ﾠ los	 ﾠ argumentos	 ﾠ de	 ﾠ doctrina	 ﾠ económica	 ﾠ desplegados	 ﾠ por	 ﾠ los	 ﾠ
parlamentarios	 ﾠ permiten	 ﾠ afirmar	 ﾠ que	 ﾠ la	 ﾠ competencia	 ﾠ teórica	 ﾠ de	 ﾠ los	 ﾠ principales	 ﾠ
participantes	 ﾠ en	 ﾠ el	 ﾠ debate	 ﾠ era	 ﾠ elevada.	 ﾠ La	 ﾠ difusión	 ﾠ de	 ﾠ este	 ﾠ debate	 ﾠ conduce	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ la	 ﾠ
conclusión	 ﾠde	 ﾠque	 ﾠlos	 ﾠdebates	 ﾠeconómicos	 ﾠen	 ﾠel	 ﾠparlamento	 ﾠconstituyeron	 ﾠuna	 ﾠpieza	 ﾠ
importante	 ﾠen	 ﾠel	 ﾠproceso	 ﾠde	 ﾠexpansión	 ﾠe	 ﾠinstitucionalización	 ﾠde	 ﾠla	 ﾠeconomía	 ﾠpolítica	 ﾠ
en	 ﾠla	 ﾠEspaña	 ﾠcontemporánea.	 ﾠ
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Introduction 
 
It has not been until recently that a substantial number of historians of economics have 
enlarged the boundaries of their research, shifting away –as A.W. Coats put it– “from 
preoccupation with the history of economic theory, towards broader, less precise and 
elusive matters”, among which the interrelationship between economic ideas and their 
historical context, the professionalisation of economics, or the influence of economic 
ideas on policy.
1 In this wider framework, the study of the institutional environment in 
which  economists  historically  performed  –which  Augello  and  Guidi  named 
“institutional history of political economy”
2– has become a relevant field of research. In 
particular, some scholars have focused on the penetration, diffusion and influence of 
economic  ideas  in  the  political  sphere,  exploring  how  it  fostered t h e  process  of 
institutionalisation of political economy in Western World, especially at the time in 
which  it  consolidated  as  a  formal  field  of  knowledge  and  its  practitioners 
professionalized, in the second half of the 19
th century and first decades of the 20
th 
century,  in  the  framework  of  liberal  parliamentarian  regimes.  In  other  words,  a 
significant branch of studies on the institutionalisation of political economy has sought 
to assess the contribution of politics to this process, this is, to examine how economics 
and  economists  influenced  political  debate,  thus  aiding  in  the  diffusion  of  political 
economy during this liberal age.
3 In this concern, the core institutions studied for that 
specific period have been national parliaments. 
 
Focusing on the case of Spain, this essay aims at making a further contribution to the 
debate on the presence of economics in politics in the liberal age. Literature on this 
issue is not abundant, except for some national cases: Britain, Portugal, and, above all, 
Italy.
4 More specifically, this paper analyses the presence and role of economic ideas in 
                                                 
1 Coats (1993), p. 1. 
2 Augello and Guidi defined the idea of studying the history of economics from the point of view of the 
relationship of economists with the institutional environment where they performed as “the history of the 
institutional contexts surrounding the discourse on political economy, or, more briefly, the institutional 
history of political economy”. Augello and Guidi (2005), p. xiv. 
3 The performance of economists in politics has actually been considered an essential part of the process 
of dissemination of economic ideas and of institutional consolidation of political economy. Augello and 
Guidi (2005), pp. xiii-xiv. 
4 Studies on the influence of economic ideas and economists in the British parliament in the 19
th century 
are pioneering: Fetter (1975, 1980), Gordon (1976), Grammp (1987), Harris (1997), Gambles (1999) and 
Schonhardt-Bailey (2003, 2006). The Italian case is probably the best known, thanks to extensive work 
developed by numerous scholars, gathered in the works edited by Augello & Guidi (2002, 2003), who   4 
the  particular  debate  on  the  introduction  of  progressive  rates  in  the  Spanish  fiscal 
system, which took place in the Spanish Parliament in 1900. This debate is relevant, not 
only in terms of the use, influence and diffusion of economic ideas (this is, concerning 
the process of institutionalisation of political economy), but also from a strictly fiscal 
point of view. The debate ensued the bill issued by the Finance minister Villaverde, 
which established progressive steps in the inheritance tax. Although it was a relatively 
small t a x   and  the  progressivity  very  limited,  this  bill  resulted  in  an  exhaustive 
discussion of the issue of tax progressivity in the Spanish Legislative. Actually, the 
debate happened to be extraordinarily controversial, if compared to other parliamentary 
discussions  in  this  campaign,  in  which  other  more  significant  reforms  in  the  fiscal 
system were being considered. Remarkably, apparent political and social implications 
of  progressivity  were  mostly  avoided  in  the  debate,  it  being  grounded  mainly  in 
technical fiscal and economic topics. The role played by economic ideas and doctrines 
in the discussion was significant, they being well grounded on first-rank international 
literature.  The  economic  expertise  of  the  members  of  the  Parliament  (from  now  on 
MPs) who intervened in the debate should also be praised. The diffusion of economic 
ideas within the Parliament and to public opinion through the press, point out that the 
parliamentary institution was effectively contributing to the diffusion of economic ideas 
into cultured society. 
 
This paper is organized as follows: First section depicts Villaverde's bill. Second section 
explores  the  parliamentary  debate  and  the  arguments  there  displayed  in  favour  and 
against this fiscal reform. Third section deals with the influence of economic ideas on 
the lines of reasoning of the MPs taking part in the discussion. 
 
 
Villaverde’s tax reform project 
 
In 1899 conservative Finance minister Villaverde launched a plan to reform the tax 
system, in the framework of a general transformation of the Spanish public finance, 
                                                                                                                                              
also edited another international monography (2005). Portuguese researchers have leaded an important 
project to assess the influence of political economy in their national Parliament: Almodovar and Cardoso 
(2005), Cardoso (2007) and Bastien and Cardoso (2009). As for Spain, an excellent survey on Spanish 
parliamentarian economists was developed by Almenar (2005). The recent book by Martín Rodríguez 
(2009) on academic economists just reaches 1874.   5 
which had been dragging out serious deficiencies for the entire century. Villaverde had 
been  appointed  minister  in  the  conservative  Silvela  cabinet,
5  which  had  succeeded 
liberals after the war against the United States and subsequent loss of the last vestiges of 
the colonial empire in 1898. The “disaster”, as it was named, plunged Spain into a sort 
of collective despair, in front of which intellectuals and politicians started calling for the 
regeneration of the nation. One of the mottos of this movement was the healing of 
public finance. Prime Minister Silvela placed this as a priority and addressed Villaverde 
to urgently handle the problems of the public debt burden and budget deficit. It seems 
that  there  was  indeed  social  demand  for  economic  stabilization  policies,  leaded  by 
taxpayers, in front of the increase in national borrowing and the problems caused by its 
inflationary financing through money issues.
6  
 
Villaverde’s  immediate  goals  were  to  reduce  the  huge  quantity  of  public  debt  –a 
problem worsened by the sums borrowed for the previous war– and to balance the 
budget; this is, to restore the Spanish credit. Concerning the debt problem, Villaverde 
decided to temporarily suspend amortization and to reduce its effective interest rate by 
charging its yields with a 20% tax. As for the tax system, he strove to set the bases to 
modernise it and improve its efficiency, so as to make it capable to face the public debt 
burden  and  to  guarantee  enough  ordinary  revenues  to  meet  public  expenditure.
7 H e  
discarded a fundamental reorganization of the entire system in order not to risk current 
revenues. The most important innovations he proposed were a new tax on some kinds of 
incomes (the impuesto de utilidades de la riqueza mobiliaria), which aimed at charging 
                                                 
5 Raimundo Fernández Villaverde, marquis of Pozo Rubio (1848-1905), was an exceptional politician in 
the  first  part  of  the  Bourbon  Restoration.  He  was  an  expert  in  Public  Finance,  and  Professor  of 
Commercial  Law  and  Criminal  Law  at  the  Universidad  Central  in  Madrid.  His  political  curriculum 
(always in the conservative party) was impressive, as it was his career as public official. He held several 
positions in the Finance Ministry, eventually becoming minister twice, in Silvela administrations (March 
1899 – July 1900 and December 1902 – March 1903). He was also appointed minister of the Interior 
twice, minister of Justice, Chairman of the Parliament, and eventually Prime Minister (during two brief 
periods  in  1903  and  1905).  He  was  also  a  member  of  the  Reales  Academias  de  la  Lengua,  de 
Jurisprudencia and de Ciencias Morales y Políticas. 
6 Taxpayers would demand stabilization measures while criticised the Spanish oligarchic political system, 
stressing the divorce between producers or entrepreneurs and politicians. Vallejo (2001), p. 351. 
7 The Spanish tax system at the end of the 19
th century was essentially the outcome of the Mon-Santillán 
tax reform of 1845. This had unified the liberal tax system under the principle of direct product taxation, 
inspired by the French model, which was complemented by some indirect taxes to generalize taxpaying 
and attain the sufficiency of the whole system. Its main levies were the tax on land property and the 
indirect tax on consumption goods. One of the flaws of this system was that capital and labour incomes 
remained almost uncharged. However, its most important limits were the short tax collecting capacity and 
its rigidity to tax new forms of wealth or new activities, which made the system shift more and more 
towards indirect taxation. See Fuentes Quintana (1990), pp. 3-47, and Vallejo (2001), pp. 39-43.   6 
new activities’ earnings that so far had avoided taxation;
8 some new taxes on specific 
consumption goods (especially alcohol and sugar); and a reform of the general tax on 
property transmissions (impuesto de derechos reales y transmisiones de bienes), which 
included the introduction of progressive rates in the inheritance tax. He completed these 
reforms with compulsory reductions of expenses in every government department and 
with restrictive monetary policy, turning back loans to the Bank of Spain. Summing up, 
Villaverde struggled to increase revenues and reduce expenses without disturbing credit 
or public services: This was the leitmotiv for his plan. This was not but the first step of a 
long-term p roject  for  the  Spanish  public  finance:  After  solving  the  debt  problem, 
balancing the budget and improving the tax system, the second stage would be the 
economic reconstitution of the country through the development of public services and 
the promotion of productive activities. The third step would be a tax relief of the most 
charged activities. Eventually, Villaverde dreamed on Spain entering the international 
gold standard monetary system.
9 
 
One  of  the  most  striking  novelties  in  this  reform  plan  was  the  introduction  of  the 
principle of progressivity in the taxation system through the inheritance tax. Before this, 
inheritance tax fees were proportional, they varying according to the relationship of the 
beneficiary to the deceased. Fees ranged from 1% of the amount inherited (applied to 
inheritances  between  direct  ascendants  and  descendants),  and  9%  (applied  to 
successions to third parties). However, some extraordinary surcharges had been recently 
imposed on behalf of the economic crisis and the war (in all, they made fees 40% 
higher).
10  Villaverde’s  project  established  different  scales  of  fees,  depending  on  the 
relationship  between  the  beneficiary  and  the  deceased.  Each  scale  had  five  steps 
according to the amount inherited. In the first scale (that with the lowest fees), applied 
to inheritances between legitimate direct ascendants and descendants, fees ranged from 
                                                 
8 It bore certain similarity to an income tax. According to Solé, it was inspired by its Italian homonymous. 
Solé (1999), p. 27. 
9 Solé (1999), pp. 29-30. According to this author, Villaverde was an enthusiastic follower of the British 
income tax, and he even thought of introducing it in Spain, but rejected the idea in front of the enormous 
difficulties he foresaw. The income tax was somehow a myth for many Spanish economists. Navarro 
Reverter, minister of Public Finance from 1895 to 1897, recognized that the idea was interesting, but 
impossible to apply in Spain because of its management difficulties. Solé (1999), pp. 25-28. 
10 In 1897, the Finance minister Navarro Reverter introduced a transitory surcharge of 10% on the tax 
rates.  Succeeding  minister,  liberal  López  Puigcerver,  increased  this  surcharge  to  20%,  and, f o r  t h e  
economic year of 1898-1899, introduced a war surcharge of another 20%, so the total surcharges grew up 
to 40% over the original rates of the tax. The issue of surcharges was important in the debate, as whether 
they were taken account of or not, Villaverde’s plan turned out to benefit or harm taxpayers.   7 
1% to 2,50%.
11 The highest fees applied to inheritances in which there was not any 
relationship between the deceased and the beneficiary: they ranged from 11% to 13%. 
There  was  not  tax  threshold.  Inheritance  tax  did  not  furnish  much  to  the  Treasury: 
According to the income budget project for 1900, its revenues amounted to only 2% of 
the budget. It was a small tax, but its significance was high, as it fell harder on wealthy 
citizens, well represented in the Parliament. Progressivity was not new in the Spanish 
fiscal system. At that time, there were a couple of small taxes which applied progressive 
rates.
12 Nor was it entirely new in political discussion: Some MPs had defended this 
type of taxation in the Parliament before, and some public finance officials had also 
supported it occasionally.
13 But the first general debate on this matter took place in the 
1899-1900 campaign, when Villaverde presented to the Parliament his tax reform plan. 
 
Villaverde’s  general  reform  project f a c e d   hard  opposition,  and  he  eventually w a s  
constrained to reduce or remove some of his proposals in order to get the Parliament 
pass.  However,  he  was  very  committed  to  the  economic  reform,  he  linking  his 
remaining in office to the general acceptance of his plans, which caused difficulties to 
Silvela’s cabinet, as many of the members of the conservative group in the Parliament 
were reluctant to accept some of the reform bills.
14 Villaverde had to fight extremely 
hard in that parliamentary campaign, often without actual support of his fellow MPs. 
Having achieved just a part of his projects, he resigned on July 1900.
15 However, his 
measures eventually served to balance the Spanish budget and to reduce the public debt 
burden. Surpluses in the public budget would last until the Morocco war in 1909, as 
Finance ministers in the following decade did not deviate from Villaverde’s schemes.
16 
 
                                                 
11 Fees in this first group were as follows: Inheritances (amount accruing to the beneficiary) under 10.000 
pesetas, 1%; from 10.001 to 30.000 pesetas, 1,25%; from 30.0001 to 50.000 pesetas, 1,75%; from 50.001 
to 150.000 pesetas, 2%; over 150.001 pesetas, 2,50%. See the bill in the Diario de Sesiones del Congreso 
de los Diputados (from now on, DSC), 1899-1900, 14, appendix 9, pp. 11-12. 
12 These were the tax on wages and salaries (impuesto de sueldos y asignaciones), in which progressive 
rates  were  applied  just  to  public  officials’  wages;  and  the  tax  on  personal  identification  documents 
(impuesto  de  cédulas  personales),  in  which  the  tax  burden  was  established  according t o  e x t e r n a l  
indicators, such as housing rent. 
13 DSC 1899-1900, 118, p. 4044; and 119, p. 4059. 
14 Martorell (2000), pp. 68-69; and (1999), pp. 73-75. 
15 Literature has made diverse evaluations of Villaverde’s reform: See Solé (1999), pp. 25-28; Vallejo 
(1999), pp. 67-69; Betrán (1999), p. 121; Fuentes Quintana (1990), pp. 61-62; Martorell (1999), p. 75; 
and  Comín  (1988),  pp.  589  and  596.  Lately,  Comín  has  stated  that  Villaverde’s  tax  system  was 
conceptually obsolete, as new fiscal principles circulated in Europe. Comín (2010), p. 231. 
16 The budget balance would serve to reduce the public debt, maintain money circulation and price level 
constant, and appreciate the Spanish peseta in front of the Sterling Pound.   8 
 
The debate on the progressive inheritance tax 
  
The  preamble  of  the  inheritance  tax  reform  bill,  issued  in  June  1899,  conveys  the 
reasons Villaverde hinged on to justify this modification. It stated that the introduction 
of progressive fees in this tax was a means to compensate the reduction made in the fees 
of the other item of the tax on property transfer (inter-vivos transmissions), which had 
been done in order to encourage trade. The new progressive structure of the inheritance 
tax would benefit poorest classes by reducing the effective fees they were subjected to, 
whereas the tax burden would fall comparatively harder on large inheritances, as their 
beneficiaries were supposed to be more qualified to bear taxes. This “fits better the 
principles of equity and distributive fairness, which call for a reduction in levies on 
small capitals, in order to make taxpaying less onerous and easier”.
17 This was the 
clearest  statement  Villaverde  made  about  the  redistributive  implications  of 
progressivity:  In  the  Parliament  he  would  be  much  more  ambiguous  concerning 
distributive connotations of progressive rates. The preamble also stressed that all the 
new fees were lower than the old ones (plus surcharges),
18 and much lower than fees 
applied to inheritances in other European countries. 
 
The debate in the Parliament did not take place until the end of January 1900.
19 Despite 
it being a discussion on a minor tax, it took up ten sessions (the longest debate in 
Villaverde’s  reform  plan),  raising  much  controversy,  probably  much  more  than  the 
government  expected.  The  debate  was  established  mostly  on  legal  and  economic 
principles,  especially  about  the  adequacy  of  progressivity  as  a  tool  to  achieve  a 
proportional  allocation  of  tax  burden.  Apparent  political  and  social  implications  of 
progressivity were almost entirely avoided. Ideas and writings by renowned political 
economists were often quoted to sustain MPs lines of reasoning (the quality of the 
discussion was praised by some of its participants).
20 
 
                                                 
17 DSC 1899-1900, 14, appendix 9, p. 2. 
18 However, this was true only for smaller inheritances, those under 30,000 pesetas. 
19 Delay in the parliamentary discussion of economic bills led Villaverde to issue a new bill on the 
inheritance tax which would allow it to rule immediately on a provisional basis. In this new bill, the 
progressive steps had been slightly modified (steps were 8 instead of 5, and fees ranged between 1 and 
2,75%; new rates hardly favoured medium-size inheritances. See DSC 1899-1900, 108, appendix 8. 
20 For instance, Azcárate (DSC 1899-1900, 119, p. 4058), Laiglesia (DSC 1899-1900, 119, p. 4073), or 
Gamazo (DSC 1899-1900, 120, p. 4093).   9 
As it was usual in economic debates, only a handful of MPs participated. They were 
mainly  economic-specialized  MPs,  not  linked  to  academic  posts  (only  a  former 
professor of political economy, Moret, was among them).
21 The economic expertise of 
the  vast  majority  of  the  MPs  taking  part  in  the  progressivity  debate  was  acquired 
through their university Law degrees and then through long careers as public officials in 
economic-related positions, or as politicians specialized in economic topics. Actually, a 
great number of them had held significant economic posts in the public administration, 
including appointments to the heads of some ministries. Many of them had been (or 
would  be  later)  appointed  Finance  ministers:  Liberals  Moret,  López  Puigcerver, 
Gamazo, Suárez Inclán and Canalejas, and conservatives Bergamín and Villaverde.
22 
The issue of progressivity divided the Parliament into two factions, although with no 
homogeneity  inside  them.  Villaverde’s  reform  was  supported  (supposedly)  by  the 
Conservative Party and the republicans, it constituting a quite unusual alliance. Their 
main representatives were Villaverde himself and Azcárate, who, nevertheless made 
severe criticisms to the project.
23 Opposition was conducted by the Liberal Party, whose 
five  major  representatives  have  been  just  mentioned.
24  Some M P s   supported  tax 
progressivity,  but  not  this  specific  project.  This  was  the  case  of  Bergamín  (a 
conservative dissident) or Canalejas.
25 As it would be expectable, many conservative 
MPs were against progressivity; however, the conservative group supported with their 
                                                 
21 Moret, a close follower of French optimistic school, had taught Political Economy between 1857 and 
1859, and then was Professor of Public Finance at the University of Madrid from 1863 until 1875. Since 
1881 he taught Administration. Almenar (2005), pp. 83 and 96; Perdices and Reeder (2003), p. 647. Only 
another scholar took part in the debate: Azcárate. 
22 This confirms Almenar’s opinion that, since 1891, the participation of university professors in politics 
decreased sharply in a context of political professionalisation and divorce between academia and politics. 
The process of specialisation in economics was increasingly endogenous. Almenar (2005), pp. 86-87 and 
92. 
23 Azcárate was a Krausist jurist and economist, committed to the progression of education and social 
reform. He was Professor of Comparative Legislation in Madrid. He used to take part actively in the 
cultural life of the country, and belonged to several royal academies and the Athenaeum. He was also the 
President of the Instituto de Reformas Sociales. Sánchez de los Santos (1910), p. 713. 
24 Moret had an impressive political career (he would be Prime Minister three times between 1905 and 
1909). He had been appointed Finance minister twice in 1870 and 1871. Suárez Inclán was appointed 
minister of Agriculture and Industry and later, of Public Finance (1912-13). López Puigcerver, another 
strong follower of the liberal economic school, had been Finance minister twice (1886-1888 and 1897-
1899). Gamazo had been the Finance minister between 1892 and 1894. See Sánchez de los Santos (1908 
and 1910), Rull (1991), Perdices and Reeder (2003) and Urquijo (2004). 
25 Bergamín and Canalejas also occupied high posts in the administration. The former was appointed 
minister in several occasions (he would be th Finance minister in 1922). Canalejas became the leader of 
the Liberal Party and was Prime Minister in 1911-1912, when he was assassinated. He had also been the 
Finance minister for a brief period in 1894-1895. Rull (1991), pp. 68 and 81; Urquijo (2004).   10 
votes Villaverde’s plan, surely in order not to put at risk the cabinet steadiness, and 
possibly confident of the defeat of the project in the Senate, as it eventually happened.
26 
 
Against progressive taxation 
 
MPs from the Liberal Party were the main opponents to the progressive scheme. They 
started  by  questioning  the  legitimacy  of  the  tax  on  property  transmission:  It  levied 
capital and not income, thus violating the basic rule in taxation that taxes should never 
destroy future taxpaying capacity. So, this tax prevented capital accumulation, hindering 
economic growth and eventually harming working class. Progressive rates made these 
state  of  affairs  worsen,  and  besides  resulted  in  lower  tax  revenues,  because  they 
stimulated  fraud.
27  However,  it  was w i t h   regard  to  progressivity i t s e l f   that  liberals 
displayed a much larger range of arguments against Villaverde’s project, trying to prove 
that  progressivity  did  not  constitute  a  fair  system  of  allocating  tax  burden,  and 
defending the traditional proportional scheme. The first argument was that progressive 
taxes  involved  wealth  redistribution.  This  was  unacceptable,  as  distribution w a s  a  
socialist idea which conferred the State a prerogative that should not have at all. López 
Puigcerver, the main adversary of Villaverde in this particular point, maintained that 
progressivity was not justified by any theory of fiscal fairness, but by the theory of the 
redistributive State, which considered taxes as tools to eliminate social inequalities, not 
only as instruments for the State to fulfil its duties and goals.
28 Moret stressed that tax 
relief for small fortunes, which progressivity entailed, should not imply higher taxes for 
large fortunes. In his opinion, tax relief to poor classes was not a matter of justice but of 
two other fiscal principles: cost-benefit calculation (costs to collect taxes from poor 
                                                 
26 In this particular matter, conservatives kept party discipline and backed Villaverde. But in other issues 
it was not infrequent that some of them absented from voting in order neither to support government plans 
nor to reject them, avoiding their responsibility for a government crisis. Actually, it was rumoured that in 
some periods, for instance in summer, conservative MPs left Madrid not for holidays, as they pretended, 
but in order not to support the government’s  policy. Martorell (2000), p. 75. 
27 López Puigcerver was the main supporter of this position. In his opinion, property transfer taxes existed 
just because they were easy to implement. DSC 1899-1900, 117, p. 4005; and 118, p. 4030. Azcárate, a 
defender of progressivity, also believed that taxes on property transmission were unjustified, as they only 
represented government eagerness to tax every human activity. DSC 1899-1900, 119, pp. 4058-4060. 
28 “Whatever the theory might be to justify or explain this tax […] you will not find any idea of justice to 
justify it; you will only find a single theory to explain it; and this is the theory of those who believe that 
the State must intervene in the distribution of wealth; the theory of those who believe that taxes are not a 
means for the State to fulfil its duties and to meet the budget expenditure; the theory of those who believe 
that taxes are something to make social inequalities to be eliminated”. DSC 1899-1900, 118, p. 4032. 
However,  some  liberals  accepted  a  certain  degree  of  anticyclical  fiscal  policy:  Gamazo  and  Moret 
believed that the government could never use taxes to create the economic cycle, but the latter admitted 
that it could “steer” it. DSC 1899-1900, 119, p. 4072; and 120, p. 4097.   11 
taxpayers were higher than the revenues they produce), and the mentioned principle of 
not  destroying  taxpaying  capacity.
29  Needless  to  say,  Villaverde  and  fellow 
conservative MPs in the debate denied that their progressive project was redistributive 
policy. 
 
A  quite  common  position  in  the  defence  of  progressive  taxes  at  that  time,  also  in 
economic literature, was to consider them as measures to counteract the supposedly 
general  regressivity  of  the  tax  system,  caused  by  the  presence  of  indirect  taxes, 
particularly those on consumption goods and necessaries. So, progressive taxes served 
to achieve real proportionality in overall taxation. Liberal MPs also rejected this line of 
reasoning: Gamazo and López Puigcerver stated that, at least in the case of Spain, there 
was no need to compensate lower classes in this regard, because there were several 
taxes  paid  only  by  the  high-income  social  group,  which  already  created  this 
compensatory effect in the whole tax system.
30 Somehow astonishingly, this opinion 
was explicitly accepted by Villaverde, who did not use this compensation argument to 
support progressivity, contrary to many European liberal authors who acknowledged the 
possibility of its existence on this basis. 
 
The third significant argument against progressivity showed well the social question 
that lay beneath this issue and the chief controversy of the reform: Progressive tax rates 
put at risk property and wealth. This was the main reasoning of López Puigcerver, who 
openly feared that, although progressivity was not new in the Spanish fiscal system, its 
spreading to new taxes would create a harmful precedent. López believed that passing 
this project would involve the eventual creation of new progressive taxes. He warned 
that this was not a matter of political debate and party competition, but something much 
more essential, as it was safety of propriety, wealth, capital and business, and therefore 
of the entire economic system.
31 As a consequence, he was intimately persuaded that 
any progressive tax was unacceptable. He explicitly grounded this belief on Léon Say 
                                                 
29 “This is not progressive, regressive or progressional: This is, simply, a matter of common sense”. DSC 
1899-1900, 119, pp. 4071-4072. 
30 Gamazo considered that the taxes paid only by upper classes amounted more than the 20% of the total 
tax revenues. In his opinion, it would be interesting to implement other sort of measures, such as a tax 
threshold to achieve a higher degree of equity, but a progressive tax on capital, as he considered the 
inheritance tax, should be never established. DSC 1899-1900, 120, p. 4095. López Puigcerver believed 
that the tax structure in Spain compensated lower and upper classes, although he admitted that, in other 
countries, circumstances could be different, such as in England. DSC 1899-1900, 119, p. 4068. 
31 DSC 1899-1900, 118, p. 4032.   12 
and  Leroy-Beaulieu's  writings.  This  argument  was  underlined  by  all  the  opposition: 
Gamazo said that the progressive inheritance tax would charge capital so heavily, that it 
was in fact confiscation. Moret also stressed the tax confiscatory character; whereas 
Suárez Inclán thought that progressivity discouraged capital accumulation.
32 Radical 
liberal MP Canalejas stated that the issue at stake was truly crucial, because its approval 
implied the actual introduction of the progressive tax principle in Spain (precedents 
were minor). He mentioned the fear many conservative MPs had in front of this reform, 
but did not dare to express frankly. This shows that Villaverde did not have the actual 
support of the conservative parliamentary group.
33 Republican MP Azcárate, in turn, 
stated that, despite the fact that progressivity already existed in the Spanish tax system, 




Last, liberals stressed the unfairness aspect of progressivity, as its rates were always 
arbitrarily  established,  and  as  it  did  not  take  into  account  taxpayer's  personal 
circumstances  (this  could  also  be  applied  to  proportionality,  but,  as  Suárez  Inclán 
pointed  out,  progressivity  aggravated  it).
35  The  problem  of  the  establishment  of  the 
steps  of  the  progression  rates,  which  depended  on  the  legislator  will,  was  widely 
stressed  by  contemporary  literature,  and  highlighted  by  opposition  in  the  debate 
(actually, this issue has remained as the most important flaw of progressive taxes)
36. 
Among the rest of criticisms made to the reform, the absence of a tax threshold for 
small  inheritances  stood  out.  Many  MPs  believed  it  was  a  strong  contradiction,  as 
Villaverde had said that his progressive plan supported low income groups.
37 
 
                                                 
32 DSC 1899-1900, 117, p. 4005; 119, p. 4070; and 120, p. 4096 
33 D S C  1 8 9 9 -1900,  120,  p.  4101.  These  grief  opinions  were  not  unanimous,  though:  MP  Romero 
Robledo,  who  was  contrary  to  progressivity,  denied  that  Villaverde’s  plan w o u l d  c a u s e  a  g e n e r a l  
introduction of fiscal progressivity in Spain. DSC 1899-1900, 120, p. 4104. 
34 DSC 1899-1900, 119, p. 4060. 
35 It was mainly Moret who stated that progressivity was arbitrary, and therefore, unfair. DSC 1899-1900, 
117, p. 4005; and 119, p. 4072. 
36 See, for instance, Neumark (1994), pp. 189-197, or Slemrod (1994), pp. 1-4. 
37 Other reasoning used by liberals was that progressive taxes were forbidden in the Constitution of 1876. 
This was quite a restrictive interpretation of the constitutional text: It just stated that the population should 
contribute to the expenses of the public administrations proportionally to their wealth (Sánchez Agesta 
(1985), p. 60). At the end of the debate, López Puigcerver uttered that the progressive inheritance tax was 
not necessary even for the reason of collecting the revenues planned in the budget: they could be easily 
raised with the old proportional system. DSC 1899-1900, 118, pp. 4023, 4029 and 4044; 119, p. 4062; 
and 120, p. 4102.   13 
In favour of progressivity 
 
The defence of the reform of the inheritance tax was carried out by Villaverde and some 
other conservative MPs close to him. Except for them, only republican MP Azcárate 
aided in the support of the advisability of progressivity. Villaverde and fellow MPs 
strongly maintained that the planned progressivity was not a redistributive measure; but, 
apart from this, they did not have a clear strategy and unified criteria to defend the 
project: Their arguments were often contradictory and Villaverde himself maintained 
conflicting lines of reasoning in the debate. Villaverde sustained that progressivity was 
neither a redistributive measure nor a social compensation device for poorest classes, 
but just a means to achieve real proportionality in taxpaying. Significantly, progressivity 
supporters  avoided  using  the  word  “progressivity”,  they  borrowing  the  concept 
“progressionality”  from  Joseph  Garnier,  to  keep  away  from  the  distributive  (and 
socialist)  connotations  and  to  ease  the  passing  of  the  project.  Conservative  MPs 
supporting Villaverde in the debate always had in mind the main goal of the reform, 
namely, to reorganise the tax system in order to make it capable to meet the State duties. 
As MP Laiglesia, the chairman of the parliamentary budget commission, pointed out, 
the object of the entire project was both to strengthen direct taxes and to find new fiscal 
resources, mainly taxing activities that so far had avoided taxation.
38 Villaverde firmly 
believed that the tax base in Spain was much larger than data from fiscal administration 
stated: there was not a correlation between the wealth of the country and the State 
resources.
39  Villaverde  started  the  debate  justifying  the  legitimacy  of  the  property 
transmission tax, attacked by the liberals: It was the State the institution that guaranteed 
the validity of contracts of transmissions; therefore it had the right to take a part of the 
amount transferred as a payment for the guarantee supplied.  
 
Regarding the progressivity issue, as it has been said, Villaverde tried not to use the 
argument of the progressive tax as a way to correct the tax system general regressivity 
caused by indirect taxes. However, his reasoning throughout the debate was sometimes 
confusing, and he indirectly ended up acknowledging that relief of poor classes (which 
                                                 
38 DSC 1899-1900, 119, p. 4075. 
39 Villaverde believed that the financial difficulties of the state were not a direct consequence of the 
economic crisis of the end of the century: There had been economic growth since the central decades of 
the century, but it had not reflected in the public incomes. Villaverde (1973), pp. 593-594.   14 
his progressive tax entailed) was a matter of correcting unfair tax burden allocation.
40 
Nevertheless, he attempted to pass over this issue by simply rejecting the existence of 
any actual progressivity in the inheritance tax: His project only involved what he called 
“progressional proportionality”, in the sense defined by Garnier, and also adopted by 
J.B. Say and J.S. Mill. Villaverde claimed that he needed to charge direct inheritances 
with  a  fee  of  1,70%  in  order  to  accomplish  the  balanced  budget.  By  using  his 
progressive model, he assumed to relief the lower classes fulfilling the constitutional 
real proportionality requirement. So, as he said, the inheritance tax turned out to be not 
progressive, but degressive: its goal was to reduce the tax burden on small fortunes.
41 
Therefore,  Villaverde’s  plan  of  a  limited  progressivity  was  the  result  of  combining 
public  finance  requirements  and  constitutional  justice  commands,  but  it  was  also  a 
consequence of his fidelity to the fiscal principle of ability to pay in the allocation of the 
tax burden as the best way to attain taxation justice. In order to accomplish this –what 
he  called  “proportionality  of  faculties”,  which  he  believed  was  commanded  in  the 
Constitution–, it was necessary to implement the progressivity system in some taxes.
42 
In another occasion, the minister said that taxes were the contribution of each citizen in 
proportion to his wealth, so that the State could exist: This “proportion” was sometimes 
better  achieved  through  a  graduate  scale.  This,  he  stated,  was  Léon  Say’s  doctrine, 
which he followed.
43 Azcárate also interpreted the constitutional “proportionality” as 
“proportionality of faculties”.
44 This idea led him to support the progressive system, 
always in Garnier's limited fashion. In his opinion, the “progressional” tax fitted well 
with  the  values  of  freedom  and  justice,  whereas  the  pure  proportional  system  was 




                                                 
40 Villaverde corrected the argument used by his fellow MP Fernández Hontoria, who had said that the 
progressive scale was a device to correct the overall regressivity of the tax system, caused by the indirect 
taxes. The inheritance tax was a mechanism to achieve tax justice, looking for the real proportionality 
commanded by the Constitution. DSC 1899-1900, 118, p. 4029. This shows the confusion conservatives 
had in the defence of progressivity. 
41 D S C  1 8 9 9 -1900,  118,  pp.  4036-4039.  Laiglesia  called  Villaverde’s  proposal  of  progressivity  as  a 
“modern proportionality” and remarked that the real progressivity was in fact the suggestion of liberals to 
establish a tax threshold. DSC 1899-1900, 119, p. 4075. 
42 DSC 1899-1900, 118, p. 4040. 
43 DSC 1899-1900, 119, p. 4060. 
44 Azcárate said that the constitutional order to pay taxes according to the individual ability should not be 
interpreted in a restricted way, as if it stood for proportionality in taxation. DSC 1899-1900, 119, p. 4061. 
45 DSC 1899-1900, 119, p. 4068.   15 
Having  stated  the  not  progressive  nature  –in  the  redistributive  meaning– o f  his 
inheritance tax reform, Villaverde faced the other attacks launched by the liberals: First, 
he  absolutely  rejected  the  idea  of  using  taxes  as  a  mechanism  to  modify  wealth 
distribution,  as  a  socialist  tool  to  equal  fortunes.  This  idea,  defended  by  the 
Kathdersozialisten, was absolutely alien to his economic and political thought.
46 In this 
concern, Azcárate supplied him with solid support, he rejecting the use of taxation as a 
redistributive mechanism, for, in his opinion, making use of taxation as an instrument 
for social reform was a mistake (he explicitly rejected Wagner’s idea of using taxes for 
social transformation through wealth redistribution)
47. Second, Villaverde denied that 
progressivity  had  been  proposed  as  a  compensatory  device:  Although  the 
“progressional” technique of taxing used direct taxes to counteract the relatively greater 
harm caused to low-income economies by indirect taxes, there was no need of this 
effect  of  compensation  in  Spain.  This  was  because,  in  his  opinion,  taxes  on 
consumption turned out to be mostly direct taxes, as in practice they functioned as 
surcharges on the main direct taxes on agricultural and industrial activities returns. For 
this reason, implementing the progressive inheritance tax would not lead to an extension 
of  progressivity  to  every  tax.  Thus,  Villaverde  was  trying  to  reassure  liberals  and 
conservatives, most of them defenders of proprietors’ interests. As a matter of fact, 
Villaverde said that he had not recommended the progressive system to be applied also 
to inter-vivos property transfer in order to avoid any risk of confiscation, because one 
asset could be transmitted several times in a short period.
48 On the contrary, Azcárate 
considered  progressivity  legitimated  only  in  the  framework  of  the  theory  of 
compensation: Progressivity itself was not fair, but served to compensate the excess of 
tax burden on lower classes caused by indirect taxes. In his opinion, this was the idea 
supported by Leroy-Beaulieu and Léon Say.
49 Third, progressivity supporters denied 
that the inheritance tax would hamper capital accumulation or risk economic growth 
                                                 
46 “This is not a progressive tax, a progressive tax […], as it has been defended by the Kathdersozialisten 
in their books and lectures, and as it has been defended by action socialists in their programmes, is a fiscal 
device with which the State intervenes in the distribution of wealth. It entails a constant, continuous and 
practical progression, equal or bigger than the progression of wealth; it tends to make fortunes equal […] 
It is not, therefore, a fiscal mechanism to intervene in wealth distribution; it is a financial tool, seeking 
proportionality”. DSC 1899-1900, 118, p. 4040. 
47 “There is a school […] which supports progressive taxation, what for? Wagner has stated it, he making 
a glaring error; he has stated that time has arrived for this tax to cease to be a mere fiscal device; it must 
become a tool for social reform. And this is a fundamental error: this tax will never be other than a fiscal 
device”. Azcárate believed that social reforms should be implemented through laws, not through taxes. 
DSC 1899-1900, 119, p. 4060. 
48 DSC 1899-1900, 120, p. 4106. 
49 DSC 1899-1900, 119, p. 4060.   16 
because it was extremely small. Laiglesia estimated that this tax amounted just 1,26% of 
the total tax base in Spain, according to statistics from 1890-1891 and presupposing that 
GDP  had  remained  constant.
50  The  lack  of  tax  threshold  (claimed  by  some 
parliamentarians, including Azcárate, and qualified by Villaverde as true progressivity) 
was a sort of contradiction in Villaverde’s plan, he being well aware of this. Fernández 
Hontoria,  another  conservative  spokesman M P ,  recognized  that  the  minimum  tax 
exemption would be desirable, but it was not possible to apply because the Treasury 
could  not  dispense  with  those  revenues.  Anyway,  he  rejected  the  assumption  that 
progressive taxes necessarily implied tax exemptions.
51 
 
The  debate  of  the  inheritance  tax  seldom  touched  the  distributive  aspects  which 
progressive taxation involve. Although liberal MPs insisted on this line of reasoning in 
order to attack progressivity (taxation should not be a tool for income distribution), 
Villaverde,  by  radically  denying  that  inheritance  tax  rates  entailed  any  distributive 
consequence, avoided a general debate on taxation fairness, which would have probably 
prejudiced  his  reform.  Redistribution  was  deemed  a  socialist  policy,  and  therefore 
Villaverde could never acknowledge the ultimate consequences of progressive taxation. 
The  lack  of  social  debate  might  be  also  connected  to  the  structure  of  the  Spanish 
Parliament:  In  spite  of  the  country  having  male  universal  suffrage  since  1891, 
traditional elites managed to keep workers’ parties out of the Legislative, or scarcely 
represented.  Instead,  the  debate  lie  in  fiscal  technical  arguments  on  the  means  to 
approach tax proportionality, which was widely considered as the cornerstone of tax 
fairness, or the limits of tax rates and its effects on property. 
 
Villaverde’s  commitment  to  the  defence  of  the  progressive  inheritance  tax  is 
undeniable, and he eventually could get his project to pass the Parliament proceeding.
52 
However, as probably many MPs expected, it did not get the Senate pass. This opened 
an  institutional  crisis,  as  some  MPs  complained  about  the  real  significance  of 
parliamentarian debates. Ironically, the only progressive measure the Senate agreed to 
pass was a tax threshold for the inheritances below 1.000 pesetas, which Villaverde 
                                                 
50 Villaverde believed that a maximum tax rate of 2,75% could hardly damage capital. He insisted that his 
project did not raise tax rates, but, on the contrary, lowered them (he was taking into account the effect of 
the temporary surcharges). DSC 1899-1900, 119, pp. 4064-4065; and 120, pp. 4105-4112. 
51 DSC 1899-1900, 118, p. 4029. 
52 Solé said that Villaverde’s interventions in the Parliament to defend the progressive inheritance tax 
were much longer than any other discourse he made to support any other tax reform. Solé (1967), p. 203.   17 
eventually accepted.  The reform of this tax was settled by the Law of 2 April 1900. 
Although Villaverde did not succeed in his attempt to establish a progressive tax, as it 
happened in other European countries, he nevertheless had sowed a crucial idea, quite 
early  in  comparison  with  other  nations’  fiscal  systems.  A  tax  on  inheritances  with 
progressive  rates  would  be  introduced  later  by  the  Finance  minister  Osma,  it  being 
limited to inheritances to distant relatives and third parties. Cobián established a general 
progressive inheritance tax in 1910. 
 
 
Ideas on progressive taxation in the Parliament 
 
MPs in the debate often made references to ideas and works by renowned economists in 
order to reinforce their lines of reasoning. Liberal authors, mostly French, were most 
quoted  as  sources  of  authority.  This  matched  the  Spanish  economic  thought 
environment at that time: In spite of the fact that the highly influential Spanish liberal 
school  of  economic  thought  (the  Escuela  economista,  which  flourished  in  the  mid-
decades on the 19
th century), had already faded away, new trends of economic thought 
(represented mainly by Krausist and Social-Catholic authors) had accepted the main 
tenets of economic liberalism, and therefore did not supply with doctrinal renewal. The 
main works produced by Historicists and Kathedersozialisten were known by Spanish 
economists at the end of the century, but their ideas never found major support, as they 
postulated  a  wider  scope  for  State  intervention  in  the  economy,  with  redistributive 
connotations. As for marginalism, the degree of knowledge of this school in Spain at 




Therefore,  French  liberal  economists  specialized  in  public  finance  were  the  most 
mentioned  authors  in  the  Parliament.  Leroy-Beaulieu  and  Léon  Say’s  ideas  were 
profusely used, both by supporters and enemies of progressivity. Garnier’s idea of a 
limited progressivity was the crucial reference for Villaverde and fellow MPs;
54 and J.S. 
Mill and J.B. Say were also mentioned in their discourses. Socialist theories of taxation 
showed  up  in  the  debate,  just  to  be  absolutely  rejected  by  both  sides.  Wagner  was 
                                                 
53 On the Spanish economic thought in the 19
th century, see Almenar (2000) and Serrano et al. (2001) 
54 The idea of "progressionality" was in Garnier’s Elements d’Économie politique (1848).   18 
quoted, most of the times to discard his thoughts on taxation as a mechanism of wealth 
redistribution. However, the rejection of this part or his doctrines did not prevent his 
works to be highly considered among contemporaneous Spanish economists on behalf 
of  their  deep  scientific  character.  Needless  to  say,  uses  of  intellectual  sources  in 
parliamentary  debates  were  often  instrumental.  However,  it  is  remarkable  that  MPs 
seemed to be aware of the main European taxation theoretical trends and to know well 
the ideas and authors they were using in the debate, and also other countries’ policies 
concerning progressive taxation. In this regard, most quotations seemed to be solidly 
grounded. It is also worth to observe that no Spanish economist was mentioned in the 
debate. 
 
Opponents  to  progressive  taxation  grounded  their  arguments  on  the  theoretical 
framework  supplied  by  Leroy-Beaulieu  and  Léon  Say,  particularly  MPs  Moret  and 
López Puigcerver. Leroy-Beaulieu clearly stood against tax progressivity, rejecting its 
theoretical foundations (the theory of equality of sacrifice) for it being “sentimental” 
and not reasonable. In his opinion, progressivity was either useless if it was mild, or 
extremely  harmful  if  it  was  strong.  The  expansion  of  progressivity  would  create 
impossible and unfair situations, leading to confiscation of every increase in income; for 
this reason, mathematical progressivity was impossible to apply, and some systems had 
been devised to limit it.
55 Leroy stressed the arbitrary characteristic of progressivity and 
its  tendency  towards  the  correction  of  social  inequalities,  which  he  considered 
“dangerous”.
56 Léon Say agreed with Leroy in the principle of national solidarity as the 
base for allocating tax burden in a country, rejecting the theory of equality of sacrifice, 
and also in the impossibility of a mathematical progressivity. This had been replaced 
with a “rationally limited progression”, this is, Garnier’s system of “progressional tax”, 
which applied progressive rates not to the whole tax base, but to increases in the tax 
base.
57 In L. Say’s opinion, it was impossible to scientifically determine the rate of 
progressivity,  as  the  inequality  of  sacrifice  could  not  be  measured  in  money.  Like 
Leroy, L. Say feared the consequences of progressive taxation: if rates were high, it 
                                                 
55 Leroy-Beaulieu (1906), pp. 178 and 186-189. Leroy said that J.B. Say’s system to limit progressivity 
avoided the whole income to be absorbed by the tax, but, anyway, rates made it intolerable. 
56 Leroy compared the arbitrariness of progressivity to the establishment of a tax threshold, which had no 
arbitrariness, except for the definition of the threshold. In his opinion, progressive tax was not useful 
because the wealth taxed to high rates was not big enough so as to provide large revenues, and rich people 
would try to commit fraud. A light income tax would produce equal revenues than a strong progressive 
tax, without causing so many problems. Leroy-Beaulieu (1906), pp. 182-183, 190, 200-202 and 214. 
57 Léon Say (1894), p. 365.   19 
destroyed capital; if moderate, they did not supply but very short revenues.
58 All these 
ideas were put forward by liberal MPs in the debate, they closely following the lines of 
reasoning  of  these  two  authors,  particularly  Leroy's.  These i n fluences  were  openly 
acknowledged: López Puigcerver followed Leroy’s Traité de la science des finances in 




MPs in favour of progressivity based their argumentation on doctrines by J.S. Mill, 
Jean-Baptiste Say and Garnier, but also on Leroy-Beaulieu and Léon Say’s ideas, as 
these two authors observed some exceptional cases in which progressive rates could be 
admissible. Villaverde justified his progressive tax project on Mill’s theories, which 
rejected general taxation progressivity, but accepted it for inheritance taxes.
60 He also 
leant  on  Jean-Baptiste  Say's  writings.
61  Villaverde  claimed  that  his  plan  had  been 
inspired on Garnier’s “progressional proportionality”; hence, his inheritance tax was not 
actually progressive. He left this expression only to taxes seeking wealth redistribution, 
as  defended  by  Wagner  and  the  Kathedersozialisten.  He  also  reminded  that 
“progressional” taxes existed in Switzerland, Holland, the United Kingdom and France 
(although  it  was  here  temporarily  suspended).  Azcárate  backed  his  support  to 
progressivity  following  Garnier’s  model,  and  explicitly  rejecting  Wagner’s  ideas  on 
redistribution. He recognized that Leroy-Beaulieu and Léon Say discarded progressivity 
in  general  (even  in  its  “progressional”  form),  but  he  tried  to  justify  the  limited 
progressivity contained in Villaverde’s project as the exception those authors accepted 
to compensate the general regressivity caused by indirect taxation.
62 
 
Certainly, Leroy and L. Say accepted an exception in the introduction of progressivity, 
this is, counterweighing the effect of indirect taxes. Leroy named this exception impôt 
degressif, which intended to relieve lower tax bases, instead of surcharging higher tax 
bases. Direct tax exemption or moderation, especially in taxes on income, would be 
admitted. This was justified by the existence of indirect taxes in fiscal systems; tax 
                                                 
58 Léon Say (1886), pp. 172-173. 
59 DSC 1899-1900, 118, p. 4044; and 119, pp. 4067-4068 and 4072. López Puigcerver stated that L. Say 
had opposed Poincaré’s progressive tax reform in France 1894. 
60 DSC 1899-1900, 118, pp. 4039-4040; and 120, pp. 4108-4109. See Mill (1987). 
61 J.B Say had stated in his Traité d’économie politique that “taxation cannot be equitable, unless its ratio 
is progressive”. J.B. Say (2001), p. 455. 
62 DSC 1899-1900, 119, pp. 4060-4061 and 4069.   20 
relief served to compensate poorer people. According to Leroy, the degressif tax would 
relieve totally or partially lower tax bases, but then it should charge the rest of taxpayers 
or taxable base (in fact, the vast majority of it) with a uniform tax rate.
63 Léon Say also 
accepted a sort of degressif tax, proposing a moderate form of progressivity: a tax relief 
for tax bases which were equal to the minimum amount to survive. Although he thought 
that it was questionable from the equity point of view, he accepted tax relief for the 
smallest tax bases and tax moderation for medium tax bases in order to compensate the 
effects of indirect taxation. As in Leroy’s case, this would be a system to recover real 
proportionality  in  taxation,  justified  by  the  existence  of  taxes  that  surcharged  low-
income  social  groups.  He  considered  that,  although  progressive  rates  were  always 
arbitrary, even in this case, it was essential to recognize the great difference between 




Although most MPs seemed to know well the sources they used, there were doctrinal 
misuses in the debate. The case of Leroy-Beaulieu, contrary to progressivity but ready 
to accept the degressif exception, is evident. Leroy approved progressive rates in a very 
concrete form, which did not match Villaverde’s inheritance tax. In this case, Leroy’s 
ideas could well support arguments against progressivity, as López Puigcerver said, but 
not the opposite position. So, Azcárate was not right quoting Leroy’s exception to the 
proportional  system.  Nor  was  right  liberal  López  Puigcerver  when  he  invoked 
Proudhon’s censure of progressive taxes (as Proudhon deemed all taxes, as they were 
actually constituted, unfair).
65 In any case, many liberal economic authors were rather 
ambiguous in their writings about taxation, which allowed politicians to make use of 
these  sources  quite  comfortably.  This  was  the  case  of  Léon  Say.  He  was  against 
progressivity, but he accepted it as an exception in a broad sense, to be applied in 
systems in which there were indirect taxes that charged harder lower fortunes, just to 
recover proportionality. So, his ideas could be used both for advocates and detractors of 
progressivity. Villaverde did not back his plan with this argument of compensation, and 
neither did it on behalf of Leroy’s ideas, as he probably knew they did not suit him. On 
the  contrary,  Garnier  was  the  author  who  best  fitted  Villaverde’s  plan.  Certainly 
                                                 
63 Leroy-Beaulieu (1906), pp. 203-205. 
64 Léon Say (1894), p. 366; (1886), pp. 180, 185 and 190-192. 
65 DSC 1899-1900, 118, p. 4040; Proudhon (1868), p. 185.   21 
Villaverde  and  his  fellow  MPs  tried  to  make  up  progressivity  naming  it 
“progressionality”. However, this fiscal expression, created by Garnier some fifty year 
before, could not hide the real idea behind it.
66 Probably the only clear support for 
progressivity was the economic thought of Kathedersozialisten. But this source could 
not be used, even partially, because of the fear to socialism which was so widespread 
among  upper  and  medium  classes  in  Spain.  The  absence  of  mentions  to  Spanish 
economic writers among the authorities used to support MPs’ arguments is remarkable, 
in spite of the fact that public finance was a fashionable topic in contemporaneous 
Spanish economic literature and that some valuable works on fiscal matters had been 




Concerning the diffusion of the debate on progressivity, it should be said that it raised 
interest  among  Spanish  cultured  society.  Media  in  general  used  to  pay  attention  to 
economic debates in the Parliament. Although only a few newspapers went into the 
matter  in  depth,  some  others  also  grasped  the  magnitude  of  this  debate  and i t s  
consequences to the Spanish fiscal system, and highlighted its doctrinal depth. Nearly 
all  newspapers  positioned  in  the  debate.  Conservative-oriented  papers  in  general 
supported Villaverde: La Época praised Villaverde’s interventions in the Chamber; it 
even  stated  that  equity  in  taxation  was  slowly  leading  to  the  introduction  of 
progressivity in more taxes. El Tiempo condemned opposition’s “deplorable campaign” 
against the government. El Heraldo de Madrid evoked one of MP Canalejas’ address, 
favourable to progressivity. El Nacional considered the project “very healthy and very 
democratic”, and severely criticised liberals for rejecting progressive taxation, against 
the tradition of their party.
68 Newspapers linked to the Liberal Party wrote against the 
new inheritance tax. El Globo qualified progressivity as a “revolutionary demand”, and 
“essence of socialist doctrine”. El Liberal was extremely critical of Villaverde, but also 
                                                 
66 According to Olózaga, the first to speak of “progressionality” was Garnier in his Traité des finances. 
Olózaga (1886), p. 488. 
67 The only exception, although his name was not mentioned, was Piernas Hurtado, the main public 
finance specialist at that time. His ideas were mentioned several times, although not directly connected to 
the issue of progressivity, but concerning a general taxation model. Piernas referred to the progressivity 
debate in the 1900-1901 edition of his Tratado de Hacienda Pública: He stated that neither progressivity 
nor proportionality could really achieve tax equity. Piernas (1900-1901), pp. 291-300. 
68 La Época, 17-19 June 1899, 27 January 1900, and 1, 2 and 4 February 1900; El Tiempo, 2 and 4 
February 1900; El Heraldo de Madrid, 17-24 June 1899 and 6 February 1900; El Nacional, 2 February 
1900.   22 
of  liberal  opposition  for  not  being  tough  enough.  The  weekly  finance  periodical  El 
Economista  devoted  three  long  articles  to  the  issue,  warning  against  “the  socialist 
criterion, without precedent in our country”, and accusing conservatives for attacking 
property and capital.
69 El Correo, neutral, published that this “profitable discussion” 
was not a matter of tax rates, but of tax structure. In June 1899, this journal stated that 
Villaverde’s budget had at least fostered interest for political economy in the country, 
which was “a symptom of regeneration”.
70 La Época and El Nacional highlighted the 






The  1900  debate  on  the  progressive  inheritance  tax  was  not  a  discussion  on  a  key 
instrument  of  economic  policy,  nor  was  it  a  crucial  event  for  the  contemporaneous 
political  process,  and  the  eventual  outcome  hardly  had  actual  fiscal  consequences. 
However, it had some attributes that make it interesting and important both in terms of 
fiscal modernization of Spain and in terms of the process of diffusion of economic ideas 
and of political economy itself through political institutions. 
 
Concerning the Spanish fiscal development, this debate entailed the introduction in the 
political debate of a modern crucial topic in fiscal theory, with implications in income 
distribution and, in all, in the organization of society. However, the debate did not lie in 
redistributive issues, as advocates of progressivity absolutely denied that progressive 
rates in the inheritance tax could involve any measure of social justice. On the contrary, 
the debate was established mainly on economic and fiscal technical matters, leaving 
apart arguments of wealth distribution lying behind progressive taxes. The context of 
this debate was particular: It was a non-representative parliamentarian system, in which 
only elites were well represented, which probably aided to prevent a deep debate on tax 
justice. In spite of a challenging atmosphere with increasing social clashes, not a single 
MP mentioned that this debate and the subsequent implementation of a progressive tax 
                                                 
69 El Globo, 18-24 June 1899 and 2 February 1900; El Liberal, 4 February 1900, El Economista, 8 
December 1899, 10 February, pp. 96-97, and 10 March 1900, pp. 164-166. 
70 El Correo, 2 February 1900, and 18-21 June 1899.    23 
could serve to pacify society. The issue of a conservative Finance minister launching 
this bill is also atypical. The most plausible explanation has to take it into account the 
current process of economic reforms in which Villaverde was engaged, with the aim of 
modernising  the  national  economic  structure.  In  this  regard,  both  the  regeneration 
movement in Spain after the 1898 political crisis and the example of modern nations, 
such  as  the  United  Kingdom  and  France,  in  their  contemporaneous  attempts  to 
implement progressive rates in their inheritance taxes (which took place in 1894 and 
1898 respectively), should have not been insignificant. 
 
The debate was quite fertile regarding economic thought. MPs used economic ideas and 
theory,  grounding  their  opinions  in  well-known  international  fiscal  literature:  It 
mirrored to a large extent the intellectual debate concerning progressive taxation that 
economists  were  having  through  their  writings.  The  analysis  of  arguments  and  of 
influences  allow  saying  that  the  expertise  of  the  Spanish  MPs  taking  part  in  the 
progressivity debate was noticeable: They knew well both doctrinal sources and fiscal 
policies  implemented  in  other  European  countries.  The  quantity  and  quality  of 
economic ideas displayed, the transcendence of the topic and the controversy it raised, 
and its diffusion mostly through the press, made this specific debate to enhance the role 
of the Parliament in the transmission of economic ideas. No doubt this is a relevant case 
in i t s   particular  contribution  in  the  contemporaneous  process  of  expansion  and 
institutionalisation  of  political  economy,  both  in  the  political  realm  and  in  Spanish 
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